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AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 
Francesca Laguardia 
ABSTRACT—Recent years have seen an increase in right-wing extremist 
violence within the United States, which has highlighted the disparities in 
law enforcement’s handling of “international” as opposed to “domestic” 
terrorism. Public, legal, and law enforcement commenters have begun 
calling for a “domestic terrorism statute,” arguing that the lack of such a 
statute is the largest hurdle in prosecuting domestic terrorists. This Essay 
explains that the primary cause of the disparity in prosecutions between 
domestic and international terrorists is not a lack of a domestic terrorism 
statute but rather the lack of a generalized terrorism statute and the failure to 
designate right-wing organizations as “terrorists.” Law enforcement 
pursuing international terrorists rely on these designations and material 
support statutes far more than on any statutes prohibiting terrorist acts, 
largely because the acts prohibited are so limited that they are rarely useful, 
even in the international context.  
 But the two options of designating domestic terrorist organizations or 
creating a broad terrorism statute are highly problematic. This Essay 
discusses the barriers to prosecuting domestic terrorists as terrorists, 
including the problems with current terrorism statutes in responding to 
modern, small scale attacks and the tactics used to prosecute international 
terrorists. It then explores the problems with broad, generalized terrorism 
statutes that have been passed at the state level and drafted in Congress, and 
the problems with simply applying the international framework for terrorist 
designations to domestic terrorists. Finally, it suggests several alternative 
options to lessen the disparity between the handling of right-wing and other 
domestic terrorists, and international terrorists. 
 
AUTHOR—Associate Professor, Justice Studies, Montclair State University. 
J.D., New York University School of Law, 2007; Ph.D., New York 
University Institute for Law and Society, 2012. I would like to thank Michel 
Paradis, Karen Greenberg, and the Justice Initiative at the Center on National 
Security at Fordham Law School. The Justice Initiative was founded to 
explore all sides of the question of policing domestic terrorism. Its goal is to 
114:212 (2020) Considering a Domestic Terrorism Statute and Its Alternatives 
213 
connect policymakers, law enforcement, scholars, and civil rights advocates, 
in order to ensure a robust and open discussion of the issues involved. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In October of 2018, the FBI arrested four members of the Rise Above 
Movement (RAM), a white supremacist, neo-Nazi gang that was heavily 
involved in violence at several political protests, including the infamous 
Charlottesville “Unite the Right” protest.1 Despite the group’s clear extremist 
ideological stance, open commitment to supporting their ideology through 
violence, and criminal indictments for actual violent conduct,2 they have not 
been and will not be charged with terrorism. Similarly, James Alex Fields 
Jr., the white supremacist who killed Heather Heyer at that protest, was not 
charged with terrorism, despite the parallels between his attack and recent 
ISIS-associated attacks that were classified as terrorism.3 
 
 1 Complaint, United States v. Rundo, No. 18-MJ-02791 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2018), https://int.nyt. 
com/data/documenthelper/421-robert-rundo-complaint/0f1e76cdeef814133f24/optimized/full.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C2AU-6WM3]; Indictment at 1, United States v. Rundo, No. 18-CR-00759-CJC (C.D. 
Cal. Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/RAM-rioting-
INDICTMENT36063.pdf [https://perma.cc/BBU9-GK8M]. 
 2 Complaint, supra note 1; Indictment, supra note 1, at 3–14. 
 3 Trevor Aaronson, Terrorism’s Double Standard, INTERCEPT (Mar. 23, 2019, 7:34 AM), 
https://theintercept.com/2019/03/23/domestic-terrorism-fbi-prosecutions [https://perma.cc/M44E-65L3] 
(finding that the Justice Department applied anti-terrorism laws against only 34 of 268 right-wing 
extremists prosecuted in federal court after 9/11, compared to more than 500 international alleged 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W  O N L I N E 
214 
In June of 2019, Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez made 
headlines after questioning FBI Counterterrorism Division Assistant 
Director Michael McGarrity on the inconsistencies in treatment between 
domestic and international terrorism investigations in the FBI.4 While 
questioning McGarrity and other high-ranking U.S. officials, Representative 
Ocasio-Cortez highlighted the FBI’s failure to charge domestic cases under 
terrorism statutes, even when they agreed it was terrorism, unless the crimes 
were committed by Muslims.5 She pointed out that white supremacist 
organizations have international connections—just like al Qaeda does—thus 
undermining the FBI’s argument that domestic white supremacist violence 
cannot be charged under the same internationally-focused statutes as global 
jihadist terrorism.6 She noted that “the civil rights program policy instructs 
agents to open parallel terrorism investigations whenever any suspect of a 
hate crime investigation has any nexus to a white supremacist group.”7 Why, 
then, are these extremists so rarely charged under terrorism statutes? 
This question has arisen many times in recent years.8 Articles in the 
popular press tend to conclude, as did Assistant Director McGarrity in 
response to Representative Ocasio-Cortez’s questioning, that these incidents 
were not prosecuted under terrorism statutes “because the United States 
Congress doesn’t have a statute for us for domestic terrorism like we do on 
a foreign terrorist organization like ISIS, al Qaeda, [or] al Shabaab.”9 Indeed, 
it is true that the terrorism chapter of the United States Code does not contain 
 
terrorists). Specifically, see also the case of Sayfullo Saipov, who was charged with terrorism for killing 
pedestrians on a New York City street by driving a truck into a pedestrian area. Indictment, United States 
v. Saipov, No. 17-CR-00722 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/ 
1013341/download [https://perma.cc/52FJ-VZNH]. 
 4 Mike Levine, Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Appears to Conflate Two Types of FBI Cases in Viral 
Video, ABC NEWS (June 7, 2019, 4:10 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/rep-alexandria-ocasio-
cortez-appears-conflate-types-fbi/story?id=63542165 [https://perma.cc/93TE-H4CE]; Charles P. Pierce, 
Congress Still Has No Domestic Terrorism Statute on the Books. Still., ESQUIRE (June 4, 2019), 
https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/politics/a27733112/domestic-terrorism-law-congress-white-
supremacists [https://perma.cc/9SD9-9JY7]. 
 5 Confronting White Supremacy (Part II): Adequacy of the Federal Response: Hearing on Federal 
Response to White Supremacy Before the Subcomm. on Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 116th  
Cong. (2019), https://www.c-span.org/video/?461379-1/hearing-federal-response-white-supremacy 
[https://perma.cc/C9ZC-KSYT] [hereinafter “White Supremacy Hearing”]. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 See, e.g., Aaronson, supra note 3; Mary B. McCord, It’s Time for Congress to Make Domestic 
Terrorism a Federal Crime, LAWFARE (Dec. 5, 2018, 9:13 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/its-time-
congress-make-domestic-terrorism-federal-crime [https://perma.cc/ZUU7-S488]; Samantha Michaels, 
Why So Many Violent White Supremacists Aren’t Charged with Domestic Terrorism, MOTHER JONES 
(Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2019/04/why-so-many-violent-white-
supremacists-arent-charged-with-domestic-terrorism [https://perma.cc/VZ4X-6RE4]. 
 9 White Supremacy Hearing, supra note 5. 
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any statutes that cover a mass shooting that was not inspired by the ideology 
of a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).10 But while some 
respond to this problem by calling for a domestic terrorism statute, in order 
to achieve parity of prosecutions for white supremacist terrorism,11 others 
warn that such a statute would be both harmful to civil liberties and 
unnecessary.12 Since August, several bills have been drafted in the Senate13 
and in the House of Representatives,14 in response to the increasing number 
of domestic attacks, but none have become law to date. 
This Essay asks whether a domestic terrorism statute is necessary in 
order to achieve charging parity between domestic and international 
terrorism. If so, what would such a statute look like? If it is not needed, what 
lesser statutory or policy changes might fix the gap in law enforcement’s 
toolkit? I argue that a domestic terrorism statute is less necessary and far 
more problematic than its proponents are willing to acknowledge. Unless it 
is carefully limited, a domestic terrorism statute is likely to criminalize low-
level political disruption as well as the violent attacks proponents seek to 
respond to. Truly leveling the playing field between prosecutions of 
domestic and international terrorists would almost certainly encroach upon 
pure political speech. And worse yet, even limited domestic terror statutes 
are likely to be misused and applied disproportionately against minority and 
disfavored political groups. 
 
 10 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2012); see also Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T ST., 
https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations [https://perma.cc/6QTQ-S3L4] (listing designated 
FTOs). 
 11 See, e.g., McCord, supra note 8; Jesse J. Norris, Why Dylann Roof Is a Terrorist Under Federal 
Law, and Why It Matters, 54 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 259, 259 (2017). 
 12 See, e.g., Shirin Sinnar, Separate and Unequal: The Law of “Domestic” and “International” 
Terrorism, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1333, 1333 (2019); Michael German, Why New Laws Aren’t Needed to 
Take Domestic Terrorism More Seriously, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Dec. 14, 2018), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/why-new-laws-arent-needed-take-domestic-terrorism-more-
seriously [https://perma.cc/B3T2-PCHA]; Harsha Panduranga & Faiza Patel, “Domestic Terrorism” Bills 
Create More Problems Than They Solve, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 28, 2019), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/65998/domestic-terrorism-bills-create-more-problems-than-they-solve 
[https://perma.cc/6KYH-WXQ5]. 
 13 Republican Senator Martha McSally of Arizona has circulated a discussion draft of a possible 
domestic terrorism statute. See To Penalize Acts of Domestic Terrorism, and for Other Purposes, 116th 
Cong. (Discussion Draft, 2019), https://www.mcsally.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2019-08/ 
Discussion%20Draft%20DT.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CQL-JAWZ] [hereinafter “McSally Bill”]; see also 
Burgess Everett, GOP Sen. Martha McSally Drafts Bill Making Domestic Terrorism a Federal Crime, 
POLITICO (Aug. 14, 2019, 10:59 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/08/14/martha-mcsally-
domestic-terrorism-1462301 [https://perma.cc/7VFT-9HZX]. 
 14 One such bill was introduced by Democratic Representative Adam Schiff of California. See 
Confronting the Threat of Domestic Terrorism Act, H.R. 4192, 116th Cong. (2019) [hereinafter “Schiff 
Bill”]. Another was introduced by a bipartisan coalition of Texas Representatives: Republican 
Representatives Randy Weber and Michael McCaul and Democratic Representative Henry Cuellar. See 
Domestic Terrorism Penalties Act of 2019, H.R. 4187, 116th Cong. (2019) [hereinafter “Weber Bill”]. 
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The goal of this Essay is to present the wide variety of possible 
responses to domestic terrorism, from changes in policy to statutory changes. 
I begin by briefly restating law enforcement’s dilemma in charging domestic 
terrorism cases. I then discuss several different potential responses that might 
address the charging disparities between domestic and international 
terrorism attacks. I further explain the risks these strategies entail. I conclude 
by warning that each of these options and their effects and pitfalls should be 
analyzed and understood before any statute is adopted. 
I. THE PROBLEM: WHY CURRENT TERRORISM STATUTES FAIL TO COVER 
ATTACKS BY DOMESTIC TERRORISTS 
The disparity between treatment of “domestic” terrorists and treatment 
of “international” (really, al Qaeda inspired) terrorists has been in the public 
and scholarly focus for years.15 Complaints focus primarily on the fact that 
domestic extremists are charged as terrorists exceedingly rarely. Persons 
charged as terrorists receive longer sentences and may be subject to more 
aggressive investigations with less oversight.16 Worse, the rhetoric used—
mainly labeling Islamist violence “terrorism” while violent acts by white 
extremists are “hate crimes” or various conventional criminal violations—
both reflects and encourages racism and othering.17 
It is important to note that these complaints generally do not claim that 
it may be impossible to criminally incarcerate domestic terrorists.18 Many of 
the articles focus in particular on cases, such as that of Dylann Roof (who 
opened fire in a predominantly Black church and killed nine churchgoers in 
 
 15 See generally Khaled A. Beydoun, Lone Wolf Terrorism: Types, Stripes, and Double Standards, 
112 NW. U. L. REV. 1213 (2018); Caroline Mala Corbin, Terrorists Are Always Muslim but Never White: 
At the Intersection of Critical Race Theory and Propaganda, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 455 (2017); Tung 
Yin, Were Timothy McVeigh and the Unabomber the Only White Terrorists?: Race, Religion, and the 
Perception of Terrorism, 4 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 33 (2013). For explorations of the legal divide, 
other than the three articles discussed here, see Katie Dilts, One of These Things Is Not Like the Other: 
Federal Law’s Inconsistent Treatment of Domestic and International Terrorism, 50 U. PAC. L. REV. 711, 
713 (2019); Dianne Webber, Preparing to Commit Domestic Terrorist Activity: Does the United States 
Have Adequate Tools to Stop This?, 34 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 205, 206 (2018) (suggesting the United 
States needs a preparatory statute such as those used in the United Kingdom); Nathan Carpenter, Note, 
The Ad Hoc Federal Crime of Terrorism: Why Congress Needs to Amend the Statute to Adequately 
Address Domestic Extremism, 92 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 393, 395 (2018); Adam Goldman, F.B.I., Pushing 
to Stop Domestic Terrorists, Grapples with Limits on Its Power, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2019), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2019/06/04/us/politics/fbi-domestic-terrorism.html [https://perma.cc/P3GY-WDCK] 
(describing ongoing debate); Marcy Wheeler, Dylann Roof Should Be Tried as a Terrorist: America’s 
Disturbing Double-Standard on Political Violence (and Why It Matters), SALON (July 24, 2015,  
3:58 PM), https://salon.com/2015/07/24/dylann_roof_should_be_tried_as_a_terrorist_americas_distur 
bing_double_standard_on_political_violence_and_why_it_matters/ [https://perma.cc/57K7-AXLM]. 
 16 Sinnar, supra note 12, at 1343–49, 1360 (discussing differences in investigation and sentencing). 
 17 See Norris, supra note 11, at 262; see also Sinnar, supra note 12, at 1343–49. 
 18 But see Webber, supra note 15. 
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an effort to start a race war),19 where a domestic extremist was prosecuted 
and received a harsh sentence, but was not charged as a terrorist or called a 
terrorist by certain law enforcement representatives.20 Rather than a failure 
to prosecute, the problem is that there is a disparity in public 
acknowledgment of the risk posed by domestic terrorism, and a hyper focus 
on terrorism committed by a specific religious group, which leads to 
disparate treatment by law enforcement and encourages stereotypes in the 
public.21 
Assistant Director McGarrity, and the above conversation, suggest that 
the problem is a lack of a domestic terrorism statute, but it is possible that 
this debate is better viewed as whether the United States should pass a 
terrorism statute, period. Currently, there is no general criminal statute 
prohibiting “acts of terrorism” or “violent actions taken to promote 
terrorism.” Rather than criminalizing terrorism per se, federal criminal law 
prohibits certain, very specific, activities. Those activities are crimes, 
whether they are committed for purposes of terrorism or merely to get 
revenge on a cheating spouse. Moreover, the activities are so specific and 
limited that they fail to account for many of the typical tactics of modern 
terrorists. In the following two sections I will summarize the existing 
framework for prosecuting terrorists, and then apply the framework, in order 
to show how and why the framework fails in the context of domestic 
terrorism. The problem is not, as is often described, a lack of statutes.22 
Instead, it is the specific activities that are criminalized, the specific criminal 
prohibitions that are labeled “crimes of terrorism,” the fact that domestic 
terrorists are not using the same tactics that traditional international terrorists 
have used, and the lack of material support statutes that make prosecution of 
domestic terrorists as terrorists so difficult. 
A. The Terrorism Statutes: “Federal Crimes of Terror,” Lack of a 
Generalized Terrorism Statute, and Prosecution Through Designation 
Federal criminal statutes are found in Title 18 of the U.S. Code, which 
contains an entire chapter on terrorism, Chapter 113B.23 Fittingly, the chapter 
begins with a definition of terrorism (both international and domestic), and 
then continues on to prohibit certain activities in a series of criminal 
statutes.24 An examination of the Code and typical prosecutions shows that 
 
 19 Norris, supra note 11, at 260–61. 
 20 See, e.g., Norris, supra note 11 at 263, Wheeler, supra note 15. 
 21 Norris, supra note 11, at 283; Sinnar, supra note 12;Webber, supra note 15. 
 22 See White Supremacy Hearing, supra note 5, and accompanying text. 
 23 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331–2339D (2012). 
 24 Id. 
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the real difference between domestic and international terrorists is largely 
relegated to the ability to use material support statutes to pursue defendants 
who were inspired by FTOs, rather than a lack of a “domestic terror statute.” 
1. Terrorism Statutes in the U.S. Code 
The Code defines both international and domestic terrorism as violent 
criminal acts that “appear to be intended—(i) to intimidate or coerce a 
civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by 
mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping . . . .”25 But this statute is only 
a definition, with no criminal penalties attached—no statute in the code 
attaches criminal penalties to engaging in terrorism, per se, whether 
international or domestic. A per se terrorism statute would criminalize any 
violent or otherwise unlawful acts committed in order to intimidate or coerce 
a civilian population or government. Dozens of states have passed such 
general terrorism statutes since 2001.26 As an example, Idaho defines 
terrorism as: 
activities that:  
(a) Are a violation of Idaho criminal law; and  
(b) Involve acts dangerous to human life that are intended to:  
(i) Intimidate or coerce a civilian population;  
(ii) Influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or  
(iii) Affect the conduct of a government by the use of weapons of mass 
destruction, as defined in section 18-3322, Idaho Code.27 
 
 25 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331(1), (5). 
 26 As of May of 2019, the following states have such statutes: ALA. CODE § 13A-10-151 (2019); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2308.01 (2019); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-54-205 (West 2019); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 24-33.5-1602 (West 2019); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3153 (West 2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 775.33 (West 2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-221 (West 2019); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8102 (West 
2019); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/29D-14.9 (West 2019); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-31.5-2-329 (West 
2019); IOWA CODE ANN. § 708A.1 (West 2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5421 (West 2019); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 525.045 (West 2019); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:128.1 (2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 750.543m (West 2019); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.714 (West 2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:38-2 (West 
2019); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 490.05, 490.20, 490.25 (McKinney 2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-10.1 
(West 2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2909.24 (West 2019); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1268.1 (West 
2019); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2717 (West 2019); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-23-710, 715 
(2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-8-12 (2019); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-801, 805 (West 2019); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-107.3 (West 2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-46.5 (West 2019); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 70.74.285 (West 2019); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-6-24 (West 2019).  
 27 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8102(5). 
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The Idaho statute also attaches penalties (up to life in prison) to anyone 
who commits or conspires to commit any such act.28 But no comparable 
statute exists in the U.S. Code.29 
The federal terrorism statutes included in Chapter 113B differ from the 
terrorism statutes adopted by states in two important ways. First, as discussed 
in Section I.A.2, terrorist intent is not a required element of the federal 
terrorism crimes. Second, as opposed to Idaho’s inclusion of any criminal 
act that is dangerous to human life, only very specific acts, as discussed in 
Section I.A.3, are eligible for qualification as “acts of terrorism” in the U.S. 
Code. These two differences make federal terrorism crimes quite different 
from the general public’s understanding of terrorism. 
2. Crimes of Terrorism, Independent of Terrorist Intent 
While the terrorism chapter of the U.S. Code contains several criminal 
statutes, none of them require that a defendant act to “intimidate or coerce a 
civilian population,” “influence the policy” or “affect the conduct of a 
government” to be held liable—as is required under the definition of 
terrorism.30 Crimes such as “[a]cts of nuclear terrorism” may be deemed 
terrorism with no reference to the actor’s political intent or motivation, rather 
relying on the combination of certain acts with intention to cause a certain 
minimum level of harm.31 It is true that the federal government has what 
might be considered an international terrorism statute—“Acts of terrorism 
 
 28 IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-8103(4), (5). 
 29 The state statutes have been rarely used thus far and, even if they were utilized more frequently, 
the statement made by the use of state statutes would not even out the disparity at the federal level (and 
national attention) of federal prosecutions. 
 30 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331(1)(B), (5)(B) (2012). 
 31 Id. § 2332i. No terrorist intent is necessary to violate this section. As § 2332i states: 
Whoever knowingly and unlawfully— 
(A) possesses radioactive material or makes or possesses a device— 
 (i) with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or 
 (ii) with the intent to cause substantial damage to property or the environment; or 
(B) uses in any way radioactive material or a device, or uses or damages or interferes with the 
operation of a nuclear facility in a manner that causes the release of or increases the risk of the 
release of radioactive material, or causes radioactive contamination or exposure to radiation— 
(i) with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury or with the knowledge that such 
act is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury; 
(ii) with the intent to cause substantial damage to property or the environment or with the 
knowledge that such act is likely to cause substantial damage to property or the 
environment; or  
(iii) with the intent to compel a person, an international organization or a country to do or 
refrain from doing an act, 
shall be punished as prescribed in subsection (c). 
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transcending national boundaries.”32 But that statute is itself based on 
jurisdictional requirements: that the conduct transcends national boundaries 
and involves or affects mail, interstate or foreign commerce, or federal 
employees or property.33 There is no requirement that the perpetrator act with 
any kind of terrorist intent, whether under § 2331’s definition or any other. 
In other words, any conduct creating a risk of serious bodily injury may be 
considered international terrorism under the statute, so long as the conduct 
transcends national boundaries. No political connection is necessary. For 
example, presumably, bringing a gun onto an airplane during an international 
flight and threatening to shoot someone would qualify, even if the threat is 
only to aid in a robbery and has no connection to terrorism. 
This is how nearly all of the federal terrorism statutes in the terrorism 
chapter of the U.S. Code are designed.34 Perhaps the best example is § 2332a, 
titled “Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction.” As a terrorism statute, 
included in the corresponding chapter, and focusing on an activity classically 
associated with terrorism (use of explosive devices), one might expect that 
this would be a statute used only to prosecute terrorists. However, nothing in 
the statute itself requires terroristic intent, and the statute has been used to 
prosecute other crimes, for instance, a man who “made numerous bomb 
threats intending to influence the government such that it would pay him 
money in order to stop making bomb threats.”35 
Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) provides a list of “federal 
crime[s] of terrorism,” for which the FBI (presumably the counterterrorism 
division) is granted authority to investigate when the crimes are committed 
with the added intent “to influence or affect the conduct of government by 
intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct . . . .”36 
The list includes dozens of statutes that generally spring to mind as the types 
of acts terrorists commit as part of terrorism, including sections relating to 
destruction of communication lines, stations, or systems;37 injury to buildings 
or property within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States;38 destruction of an energy facility;39 Presidential and Presidential staff 
 
 32 Id. § 2332b. It is this statute that Mary McCord has suggested should be the basis for a domestic 
terrorism statute. McCord, supra note 8. 
 33 § 2332b.  
 34 With the exception of material support statutes. See infra notes 38–51 and accompanying text. 
 35 United States v. Garey, 546 F. 3d 1359, 1361 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 36 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5). This intent approximates but does substantially differ from the definition 
of terrorism in 18 U.S.C. § 2331.  
 37 Id. § 1362. 
 38 Id. § 1363. 
 39 Id. § 1366(a). 
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assassination and kidnaping;40 and many more.41 Offering support or 
resources for the commission of any of these crimes may also be prosecuted 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (“Providing material support to terrorists”).42 This 
list of federal crimes of terrorism is also used to determine whether an 
individual, once convicted, may be subjected to the Terrorism Sentencing 
Enhancement,43 an extremely harsh enhancement that applies to any crime 
committed in order to promote one of the listed crimes.44 But the federal 
crimes of terrorism are themselves predicate offenses; some fall under the 
terrorism chapter but most are just conventional crimes that jump to the mind 
as classic terrorist activities, such as the use of weapons of mass destruction45 
or hostage taking.46 While nearly every one of these statutes could be used to 
prosecute domestic terrorists, they exist independently as conventional 
(federal) crimes. 
3. The Lack of a Generalized Terrorism Statute and the Use of a 
Terrorist Designation: Why and How International Prosecutions 
Differ from Domestic Prosecutions 
The crimes listed as federal crimes of terrorism represent both a more 
stereotypically international form of terrorism and an older form of 
terrorism, involving attacks that tend to be the product of careful planning 
by a sophisticated organization (such as bombings, hijackings, or use of 
chemical or biological weapons). They are less representative of modern and 
domestic terrorism, which tends to involve crimes perpetrated through the 
use of firearms or motor vehicles to attack pedestrians.47 There is no federal 
 
 40 Id. § 1751(a)–(d). 
 41 Id. § 2332b(g)(5). 
 42 Id. § 2339A. 
 43 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018). 
 44 The enhancement is quite severe. It requires increasing the offense level by twelve levels, to a 
minimum level of thirty-two, while increasing the criminal history category to Category VI. Id. As a 
result, for example, one sentence went from under five years to 155 years. WADIE E. SAID, CRIMES OF 
TERROR: THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF FEDERAL TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS 125 
(2015). And sentences may jump from ten years to life. Norris, supra note 11, at 278–79. 
 45 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332a (“Use of weapons of mass destruction”); id. § 2332i (“Acts of nuclear 
terrorism”). 
 46 Id. § 1203 (“Hostage taking”). 
 47 See, e.g., MARK S. HAMM & RAMÓN SPAAIJ, THE AGE OF LONE WOLF TERRORISM 35–58 (2017); 
Glenn E. Robinson, The Four Waves of Global Jihad, 1979–2017, 24 MIDDLE E. POL’Y 70, 72, 83–84 
(2017) (describing the current wave of global jihadist terrorism as the fourth wave, consisting of an online 
network urging likeminded individuals to small scale, self-directed attacks); Katie Worth, Lone Wolf 
Attacks Are Becoming More Common—And More Deadly, FRONTLINE (July 14, 2016), 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/lone-wolf-attacks-are-becoming-more-common-and-more-
deadly [https://perma.cc/4UVS-ECQ3] (noting that lone wolf attacks are becoming more common, 
chiefly rely on firearms rather than bombs, and that both jihadist and white supremacist movements are 
turning to inspiring lone wolf attacks rather than directing major operations); see also HEATHER J. 
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crime of terrorism prohibiting the use of motor vehicles to attack pedestrians, 
nor are mass shootings included in the list of terrorism crimes. These 
operational differences between older federal crimes of terrorism and more 
modern methods of terrorism highlight the true statutory division between 
international and domestic terrorism—the lack of ability to prosecute 
domestic terrorists for material support of a terrorist organization.  
In the international terrorism context, the U.S. can and does rely heavily 
on 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, which prohibits material support of an organization 
if the organization has been designated an FTO by the Secretary of State.48 
Any act committed to support an FTO, from providing funds to translating 
documents to using a van to attack pedestrians, may fall under the prohibition 
of § 2339B.49 In truth, most international terrorists are not prosecuted under 
federal crimes of terrorism. Instead, most “terrorism prosecutions” are 
material support prosecutions under § 2339B.50 Exemplifying this point, the 
Center on National Security has found that over 66% of ISIS prosecutions 
have been § 2339B prosecutions, while another 15% did not involve a charge 
of any of the statutes listed as federal crimes of terrorism.51 This suggests that 
other federal crimes of terrorism account for no more than 20% of federal 
terrorism prosecutions. The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at 
Syracuse University (TRAC) reports vastly different numbers, but with the 
same final result. Rather than looking only at ISIS cases, TRAC looks at all 
 
WILLIAMS ET AL., TRENDS IN THE DRAW OF AMERICANS TO FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS FROM 
9/11 UNTIL TODAY 22–24 (2018), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/ 
RR2500/RR2545/RAND_RR2545.pdf [https://perma.cc/55PL-JA6Y] (discussing al Qaeda and ISIL’s 
strategy to turn domestic actors within the U.S. against the U.S., and the corresponding rise of homegrown 
violent extremists: domestic attackers, acting without direction from a centralized organization); Beau D. 
Barnes, Note, Confronting the One-Man Wolf Pack: Adapting Law Enforcement and Prosecution 
Responses to the Threat of Lone Wolf Terrorism, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1613, 1649 (2012) (describing al 
Qaeda’s “shift to online activities” encouraging smaller scale attacks as part of a response to perceived 
strengths and weaknesses of law enforcement). 
 48 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. 
 49 See infra notes 56–68. 
 50 See CTR. ON NAT’L SEC. AT FORDHAM LAW, THE AMERICAN EXCEPTION: TERRORISM 
PROSECUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES—THE ISIS CASES 27–28 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2017), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55dc76f7e4b013c872183fea/t/59cf980ae45a7
c855f673bca/1506777101200/The+American+Exception+9-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZYH6-TU7D] 
(finding that out of 135 ISIS-related federal cases, over 100 were charged under material support statutes 
and over 90 of those were charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B); see also supra note 48; infra notes 50–53 
and accompanying text. 
 51 CTR. ON NAT’L SEC. AT FORDHAM LAW, supra note 50, at 28, 31. There is a broad range of statutes 
other than federal crimes of terrorism that are used to prosecute defendants in terrorism cases. According 
to the Center on National Security, “ISIS cases charged solely under more general criminal statutes most-
often involved firearms violations (such as 18 U.S.C. § 922), transmitting threats in interstate 
communications (18 U.S.C. § 875), and making false statements in a federal matter (18 U.S.C. § 1001).” 
Id. at 31. 
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cases where U.S. Attorneys report that the case was brought in connection 
with a terrorism investigation.52 According to TRAC’s analysis, § 2339B was 
the second most common individually used statute for terrorism and national 
security investigations in 2019.53 The most commonly used statute was 
18 U.S.C. § 875 (transmitting threats in interstate commerce), which is not 
on the list of federal crimes of terrorism.54 Following § 2339B was § 844, 
pertaining to arson and explosives. While some subsections of § 844 are on 
the list of federal crimes of terrorism, only three of the eleven relevant 
indictments described by TRAC charged those subsections.55 
 
 52 Who Is a Terrorist? Government Failure to Define Terrorism Undermines Enforcement, Puts Civil 
Liberties at Risk, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Sept. 28, 2009), 
https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/215 [https://perma.cc/T486-UCPR]. This method is 
problematic, as numerous studies, by TRAC itself and by government watchdogs, have shown that 
government self-reporting of terrorism cases is faulty and unreliable. TRAC states: 
During the last five-and-a-half years, one out of three (34%) of the defendants who were charged 
in federal court for one or [sic] more specific terrorism offenses were not categorized as having 
any connection to terrorism by the federal prosecutors. 
On the other hand, during the same period, one out of four (26%) of the defendants on a list of 
terrorism matters prepared by the National Security Division (NSD)—an office in the Justice 
Department—were not classified as having anything to do with terrorism by the prosecutors who 
actually brought the cases. 
Furthermore, a comparison of all of the terrorism cases listed by three separate and independent 
agencies—the courts, the prosecutors and the NSD—found that there were only 4% of the 
defendants in common. Even when the very extensive federal prosecutors’ list is constrained to 
just those connected with international terrorism or terrorist related finance, there is still only an 
8% overlap—just 66 defendants—among the lists. 
Id. For the analyses of the Department of Justice on the accuracy of its own internal reporting, see U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-266, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT: BETTER MANAGEMENT 
OVERSIGHT AND INTERNAL CONTROLS NEEDED TO ENSURE ACCURACY OF TERRORISM-RELATED 
STATISTICS 14 (2003); AUDIT DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AUDIT REPORT 07-20, THE DEPARTMENT  
OF JUSTICE’S INTERNAL CONTROLS OVER TERRORISM REPORTING, at iv (2007), http://www.justice.gov/ 
oig/reports/plus/a0720/final.pdf [https://perma.cc/5G5U-L2XY]; AUDIT DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
AUDIT REPORT 12-37, FOLLOW-UP AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S INTERNAL CONTROLS 
OVER REPORTING OF TERRORISM-RELATED STATISTICS: THE NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION, at i–ii 
(2012); AUDIT DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AUDIT REPORT 13-34, FOLLOW-UP AUDIT OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S INTERNAL CONTROLS OVER REPORTING OF TERRORISM-RELATED 
STATISTICS: THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, at ii (2013). 
 53 National Internal Security/Terrorism Convictions for 2019, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS  
ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Oct. 26, 2019), https://tracfed.syr.edu/results/9x665db4424c4b.html 
[https://perma.cc/V5KM-5DX3]. 
 54 Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5). 
 55 § 2332b(g)(5) lists 18 U.S.C. §§ 844(f)(2) (causing injury or substantial risk of injury through 
arson or explosives), (f)(3) (causing death), and (i) (using arson or explosives to damage property used in 
interstate or foreign commerce) as federal crimes of terrorism. Three of TRAC’s listed indictments 
charged § 844(i). The rest charged §§ 844(h)(1) (use of explosives in a felony), (d) (transporting 
explosives with knowledge or intent that they will be used to cause damage or death), or (e) (threats of 
arson using or affecting interstate commerce), none of which are listed in § 2332b(g)(5). TRAC lists one 
indictment as charging § 844(n), which is a pure penalty clause and likely is not the substantive charge. 
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This does not mean that all of these § 2339B prosecutions have been 
nonviolent. Instead, it shows the way that FTO designation and material 
support statutes offer opportunities to bring terrorism charges in the “global 
jihadist” sphere that are not available in the sphere of white supremacist 
terrorism. The prosecution of Sayfullo Saipov is one example. Saipov drove 
a truck onto a bike and pedestrian area in New York City, killing eight 
civilians.56 While this activity did not violate any statutes criminalizing 
specific terrorist acts, Saipov was charged under § 2339B for providing 
“services and personnel (including himself)” to ISIS.57 This is how § 2339B 
and FTO designation allows the government to reach beyond the limits of 
specific acts of terrorism in the case of certain specific terrorist ideologies. 
Section 2339B has been billed as central to counterterrorism because it 
is “preventive,”58 but what this means in practice is that it gives the federal 
government an opening to prosecute behavior as terrorism that would not 
otherwise be criminal, or would not otherwise be considered terroristic, when 
that behavior is associated with an FTO. As examples, defendants have been 
prosecuted under § 2339B for providing medical care;59 “opening social 
media accounts [e.g., Twitter and Facebook] for the use, benefit and 
promotion of ISIS;”60 buying airline tickets and attempting to travel to 
another country to join a terrorist training camp;61 recording “short videos of 
symbolic and infrastructure targets for potential terrorist attacks in the 
Washington, D.C., area;”62 and, of course, sending money, or in some cases, 
 
 56 Indictment at 10–11, supra note 3. 
 57 Id. at 10. 
 58 See Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the Challenge of 
Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 436 (2007); Francesca Laguardia, The 
Nonexceptionalism Thesis: How Post-9/11 Criminal Justice Measures Fit in Broader Criminal Justice, 
19 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 544, 550 (2016); Andrew Peterson, Addressing Tomorrow’s Terrorists, 2 J. 
NAT’L. SEC. L. & POL’Y 297, 301 (2008). 
 59 See United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 149 (2d Cir. 2011) (“By coming to meet with a 
purported al Qaeda member on May 20, 1995; by swearing an oath of allegiance to al Qaeda; by promising 
to be on call in Saudi Arabia to treat wounded al Qaeda members; and by providing private and work 
contact numbers for al Qaeda members to reach him in Saudi Arabia whenever they needed treatment, 
Sabir engaged in conduct planned to culminate in his supplying al Qaeda with personnel . . . .”) 
 60 E.g., Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, Dep’t of Justice, Alleged ISIS Supporter Indicted for 
Attempting to Provide Material Support to Foreign Terrorist Organization (July 21, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alleged-isis-supporter-indicted-attempting-provide-material-support-
foreign-terrorist [https://perma.cc/T2P3-PSCF]. 
 61 E.g., Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office of the Southern District of Ohio, Columbus Man Pleads 
Guilty to Attempting to Provide Material Support to ISIS (July 6, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-
sdoh/pr/columbus-man-pleads-guilty-attempting-provide-material-support-isis [https://perma.cc/TL5G-
3VP5]. 
 62 E.g., Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, Dep’t of Justice, Atlanta Defendant Found Guilty of 
Supporting Terrorists (Aug. 12, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/atlanta-defendant-found-guilty-
supporting-terrorists [https://perma.cc/ZZV7-QZ6P]. 
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socks;63 or any other form of support for an FTO. A defendant need not have 
knowledge or intent to aid in any particular attack, and certainly need not 
have attempted an attack.64 Following the theory that FTOs should be made 
“radioactive,” § 2339B criminalizes nearly any association, and certainly 
any aid, to designated organizations.65 The statute thus transforms legal 
behavior and conventional criminal activity into “crimes of terrorism,” not 
because it is committed with terrorist intent, but because it is committed to 
aid an FTO. 
B. Application of the Statutes: How Designation Makes the Difference 
Between Federal Terrorism Charges and Conventional Criminal Charges 
Returning to the white supremacist RAM indictment66 allows us to see 
how the current statutory scheme limits prosecution of modern terrorism, but 
then broadens it again in international (but not domestic) cases. The 
indictment asserts “RAM and its members used the Internet to post videos 
and pictures of RAM members conducting training in hand-to-hand combat, 
often interspersed with pictures and video clips of RAM members assaulting 
people at political events, accompanied by messages in support of RAM’s 
white supremacist ideology.”67 Were RAM a designated organization, this 
activity alone might well be sufficient to support a prosecution under 
 
 63 In United States v. Hammoud, Mohamad Hammoud was sentenced to 155 years for evading taxes 
on cigarettes, selling them at a reduced cost, and sending the profits to Hizballah. 381 F.3d 316, 325–27 
(4th Cir. 2004), vacated by 543 U.S. 1097 (2005). In United States v. El-Mezain, “officers and directors 
of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), formerly the nation’s largest Muslim 
charity . . . were convicted of materially supporting the FTO Hamas through monetary donations to 
religious charitable organizations called zakat committees operating in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.” 
Wadie E. Said, Sentencing Terrorist Crimes, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 477, 509 (2014) (citing 664 F.3d 467, 485 
(5th Cir. 2011)). The defendants received sentences ranging from fifteen to sixty-five years. Id. at 510. 
Syed Hashmi was charged with providing material support to an FTO, convicted, and sentenced to fifteen 
years after providing socks, blankets, and $300 to an al Qaeda operative. Colin Moynihan, U.S. Man 
Draws 15 Years for Plot to Supply Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/ 
06/10/nyregion/10hashmi.html [https://perma.cc/85CP-JE9P]; see also Francesca Laguardia, Special 
Administrative Measures: An Example of Counterterror Excesses and Their Roots in U.S. Criminal 
Justice, 51 CRIM. L. BULL. 4 (2015) (discussing Hashmi). 
 64 See Webber, supra note 15, at 218. If a defendant did intend to aid in a particular attack, he might 
be charged with 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012) instead. These prosecutions are far less common than § 2339B 
prosecutions. Id. 
 65 See, e.g., Michael Price et al., ‘Material Support’: US Anti-Terrorism Law Threatens Human 
Rights and Academic Freedom, 28 ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY 3 (2012) (“[T]he goal is clearly to deter 
contact with designated groups, to make them ‘radioactive . . . .’”); A Review of the Material Support to 
Terrorism Prohibition Improvements Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech. and 
Homeland Sec. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Andrew McCarthy, 
Senior Fellow, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/ 
media/doc/McCarthy%20Testimony%20042005.pdf [https://perma.cc/TP3K-KZP9]. 
 66 See Indictment, supra note 1. 
 67 Id. at 1–2. 
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§ 2339B.68 Moreover, the criminal complaint associated with the case states 
that the defendants traveled overseas in order to train with the Azov 
Battalion, “a paramilitary unit of the Ukrainian National Guard which is 
known for its association with neo-Nazi ideology and use of Nazi 
symbolism, and which is believed to have participated in training and 
radicalizing United States-based white supremacy organizations.”69 Were the 
Azov Battalion a designated FTO, traveling overseas to obtain training 
would be a prosecutable (terrorism) offense under § 2339B and § 2339D 
(“Receiving military-type training from a foreign terrorist organization”).70 
But neither RAM nor the Azov Battalion is an FTO, and the violence RAM 
has engaged in has been hand-to-hand combat, not long plotted strikes 
involving bombs or kidnapping.71 Such low-level attacks are traditionally 
state crimes, and even when they implicate federal offenses (such as riot or 
hate crimes), they are not listed as federal crimes of terrorism, no matter their 
intent.72 
Association with an FTO allows the government to call activity 
“terrorism,” bring terrorism charges, and obtain high sentences (thanks to the 
Terrorism Sentencing Enhancement), even in cases that involve no violence 
(i.e. pure terrorist financing cases).73 This almost never occurs in domestic 
cases.74 Association with an FTO also brings investigative authority that 
substantially differs from domestic cases. Once an individual has been 
associated with an ideology that is spread by an FTO, particularly if that 
individual has associated with the FTO online, an international nexus is 
created that lowers standards of proof, broadens federal authority to conduct 
surveillance (particularly through the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
of 1978 (FISA)75), and authorizes greater secrecy in that surveillance.76 It also 
 
 68 See Plea Agreement at 3, United States v. Elfgeeh, 14-CR-6147EAW (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/800486/download [https://perma.cc/4AGE-RPLV] (describing 
Elfgeeh’s criminal conduct as maintaining social media websites to inspire and encourage others to join 
a designated FTO). 
 69 Complaint, supra note 1, at 8. 
 70 18 U.S.C. § 2339D(a) (2012) (“Whoever knowingly receives military-type training from or on 
behalf of any organization designated at the time of the training by the Secretary of State . . . as a foreign 
terrorist organization shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for ten years, or both.”). 
 71 According to the Rundo complaint, RAM members train in hand-to-hand combat, and the 
complaint (which lists several violent interactions) only refers to punching and kicking. Complaint, supra 
note 1, at 4, 10–12. 
 72 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (hand-to-hand combat not included on list). 
 73 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 74 Sinnar, supra note 12, at 1360. 
 75 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801–1885c (2015). 
 76 Sinnar, supra note 12, at 1335–36, 1344–48 (describing the use of FISA in international terrorism 
investigations). 
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lessens oversight of federal informants.77 And the fact that domestic cases 
with no connection to FTOs so rarely qualify for charges under federal 
crimes of terrorism may make it less likely that federal agents and 
representatives use the word “terrorism” to describe even violent attacks.78 
These differences both undermine the federal government’s ability to 
confront a steadily increasing domestic threat and create inequality in the 
treatment of terror suspects based on race and religion.79 As Professors Norris 
and Sinnar have each pointed out, the disparity in treatment is not only 
fundamentally unfair, it also reinforces stereotypes, creates an inaccurate 
view of the threat, and allows the government to avoid acknowledging its 
failure to stem domestic terrorism.80 It is for these reasons that so many have 
called for a domestic terrorism statute. But is such a statute really necessary? 
The following Part offers brief descriptions of several options that might 
lessen the disparate treatment of domestic and international cases. Creating 
a domestic terrorism statute is one option, but not the only one, and the idea 
of creating such a statute has been subject to criticism. The concerns raised 
in regard to a domestic terrorism statute may also apply to most other 
options, but in varying degrees. 
II. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
A. A Domestic Terrorism Statute 
The first and most commonly suggested solution to this disparity 
between federal crimes of terrorism and more modern methods of terrorism 
is to create a domestic terrorism statute that increases federal investigative 
and prosecutorial authority.81 But while proponents of a new statute focus on 
the need to equalize resources, rhetoric, and attention between domestic 
(typically right-wing) and international terrorist threats,82 opponents warn 
that increasing federal authority will, most likely, only lead to additional 
disparities affecting minorities and disfavored political groups within the 
United States.83 Critics charge that the political preferences of the current 
 
 77 Id. at 1350 (“Justice Department guidelines do, however, require less oversight over informants in 
international terrorism investigations than in other contexts, allowing the FBI to use special and long-
term informants without the approval of a special committee of Justice Department and FBI attorneys.”). 
 78 Id. at 1337. 
 79 Norris, supra note 11; Sinnar, supra note 12. 
 80 See supra notes 16, 19 and accompanying text. 
 81 See McCord, supra note 8; McCord & Blazakis, infra note 85; Michaels, supra note 8; Norris, 
supra note 11, at 259. 
 82 See supra note 81. 
 83 MICHAEL GERMAN & SARA ROBINSON, WRONG PRIORITIES ON FIGHTING TERRORISM 2 (2018), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Wrong_Priorities_Terrorism.pdf 
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Administration limit the national focus on white supremacist organizations 
(despite their prevalence), while encouraging investigations on other groups 
such as “Black Identity Extremists,” anti-Trump protestors, and journalists.84 
It seems likely that increasing law enforcement authority to investigate 
political groups (in the interests of preventing political extremism) would 
lead to problematic, politically motivated prosecutions of opposition groups 
within the United States. 
Of course, the extent of invasive authority granted would be determined 
by the reach and language of the statute. In February 2019, Mary McCord—
former Acting Assistant Attorney General and Principal Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General for National Security at the U.S. Department of Justice—
and Jason Blazakis—former Director of the Office of Counterterrorism 
Finance and Designations at the U.S. Department of State—recommended 
drafting a domestic statute based on the existing international terrorism 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2332b.85 The basic concept behind such a statute would 
be to criminalize any such conduct, whether or not it transcends national 
boundaries, in circumstances where the conduct is committed in connection 
with an intent to engage in terrorism.86 But the conduct criminalized in 
18 U.S.C. § 2332b is far broader than what most of the public think 
constitutes “terrorism,” including crimes ranging from property damage (that 
causes substantial risk of serious injury) to murder.87 
 
[https://perma.cc/B67K-Q2TS] (“Further, within the field of domestic terrorism, the Justice Department 
has a history of minimizing far-right violence while aggressively targeting minority activists and far-left 
protest movements.”); Panduranga & Patel, supra note 12 (stating “a new domestic terrorism statute will 
undoubtedly magnify the impact of existing enforcement disparities, raising serious civil rights and 
liberties concerns” and noting the FBI’s focus on “black identity extremists”); see Sinnar, supra note 12, 
at 1333. 
 84 GERMAN & ROBINSON, supra note 8383, at 2; Panduranga & Patel, supra note 12. 
 85 Mary B. McCord & Jason M. Blazakis, A Road Map for Congress to Address Domestic Terrorism, 
LAWFARE (Feb. 27, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/road-map-congress-address-
domestic-terrorism [https://perma.cc/UJQ4-MWVQ]. 
 86 Id. 
 87 18 U.S.C. § 2332b (2012) reads: 
Whoever, involving conduct transcending national boundaries and in a circumstance described in 
subsection (b)— 
(A) kills, kidnaps, maims, commits an assault resulting in serious bodily injury, or assaults 
with a dangerous weapon any person within the United States; or 
(B) creates a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to any other person by destroying or 
damaging any structure, conveyance, or other real or personal property within the United 
States or by attempting or conspiring to destroy or damage any structure, conveyance, or 
other real or personal property within the United States; 
in violation of the laws of any State, or the United States, shall be punished as prescribed in 
subsection (c). 
Id. § 2332b(a)(1). 
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1. Proposed Terrorism Statutes and Their Troubling Breadth 
Three U.S. legislators have proposed statutes to specifically criminalize 
domestic terrorism. All three proposed statutes appear to follow McCord and 
Blazakis’ recommendation—federalizing crimes ranging from property 
damage to murder—but adding a requirement of some version of what might 
be considered “terrorist intent” (which is not required under § 2332b). In 
August 2019, Republican Senator Martha McSally of Arizona circulated a 
discussion draft of a possible domestic terrorism statute, prohibiting conduct 
ranging from threatening to create “a substantial risk of serious bodily injury 
to any other person by intentionally destroying or damaging any structure, 
conveyance, or other real or personal property,” to actually creating that risk, 
to assault, kidnapping, and murder “with the intent to intimidate or coerce a 
civilian population or influence, affect, or retaliate against the policy or 
conduct of a government.”88 Democratic Representative Adam Schiff of 
California proposed H.R. 4192, the Confronting the Threat of Domestic 
Terrorism Act, prohibiting the same conduct, “with the intent to intimidate 
or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a government by mass 
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.”89 A bipartisan group of Texas 
Congressmen—Representative Randy Weber, Representative Michael 
McCaul, and Representative Henry Cuellar—proposed H.R. 4187, the 
Domestic Terrorism Penalties Act of 2019, which omits the requirement that 
property damage cause a substantial risk of serious injury and also uses 
Senator McSally’s intent requirement.90 
In this draft legislation, these actions would not merely become federal 
crimes, they would be labeled as terrorism. Under at least one proposed 
statute it would seem, therefore, that scratching a swastika into the wall of a 
post office would be considered terrorism, subject to up to twenty-five years 
in prison.91 An argument could be made regarding this type of vandalism that 
the offender damaged a structure with “intent to intimidate or coerce a 
civilian population”—the requirement under the approach recommended by 
Representatives Weber, McCaul, and Cuellar’s proposed legislation.92 While 
 
 88 McSally Bill, supra note 13. 
 89 Schiff Bill, supra note 14. 
 90 Weber Bill, supra note 14. 
 91 Id. 
 92 The Weber Bill reads: 
(a) Offenses and penalties.—Whoever, with respect to a circumstance described in subsection (b), 
and with the intent to intimidate or coerce a civilian population or influence, affect, or retaliate 
against the policy or conduct of a government— . . . 
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the other two proposals maintain a requirement that the property damage 
carry with it a substantial risk of serious bodily injury, would these statutes 
call it terrorism to throw a brick through a window, provided there were a 
swastika on it? 
The low level of damage required for a charge of terrorism renders the 
three proposed statutes frighteningly extreme, particularly considering the 
maximum penalties of ten years to life in prison.93 But the way that these 
proposals envision terroristic intent is even more concerning. The question 
of what exactly constitutes terrorist intent is hotly debated.94 Nevertheless, 
the federal provisions for international terrorism—§ 2331 and 
§ 2332b(g)(5)—have arguably already crystalized an accepted definition. As 
was previously noted, 18 U.S.C. § 2331 defines terrorism as violent criminal 
acts that “appear to be intended—(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian 
population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or 
coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination, or kidnapping;”95 while § 2332b(g)(5)(A) defines crimes of 
terrorism as crimes committed “to influence or affect the conduct of 
government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government 
conduct.”96 
These two intent requirements are substantially different. On the one 
hand, § 2331 accounts for intimidation of a civilian population, while 
§ 2332b is only concerned with affecting government. On the other hand, 
§ 2332b allows for a terrorism designation based purely on intent to 
retaliate—i.e., acting out of anger. This seems to broaden the possible intent 
by a great deal (as is discussed in the hypotheticals below). Furthermore, 
 
(5) destroys or damages any structure, conveyance, or other real or personal property, shall 
be imprisoned not more than 25 years, fined under this title, or both . . . 
(b) Circumstance described.—A circumstance described in this subsection is, with respect to an 
offense under subsection (a), that the offense is committed— 
(1) against any person or property within the United States, and— . . . 
(B) such property is used in interstate or foreign commerce or in an activity that affects 
interstate or foreign commerce . . .  
Id. 
 93 Schiff Bill, supra note 14, states that any violation should be punished under § 2332b(c), which 
lays out minimum penalties of ten years and maximum of life in prison, depending on the level of 
damage caused. Weber Bill, supra note 14, lays out punishments of twenty-five years to life in prison. 
McSally Bill, supra note 13, creates punishments of ten years (for threats) to life in prison. 
 94 See, e.g., BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 35–36 (rev. & expanded ed. 2006); Martha 
Crenshaw, The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century, 21 POL. PSYCHOL. 405, 406 
(2000); Norris, supra note 11, at 505 (stating that any politically motivated violence is “terrorism”); Alex 
Schmid, Terrorism—The Definitional Problem, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 375, 381–84 (2004). 
 95 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2012), discussed supra note 25. 
 96 Id. § 2332b(g)(5)(A). 
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many state statutes on terrorism have already followed the federal lead, 
rendering crimes terrorism if they are committed with the intent envisioned 
in § 2331’s definition of terrorism.97 If a domestic terrorism statute was 
passed that adopted this federal intent, then the line between destruction of 
property and terrorism will turn on whether or not a defendant committed the 
destruction as part of an effort to change government policy by intimidating 
or coercing a government or civilian population.98 This definition reflects an 
apparent consensus in the academic field that terrorism is to be distinguished 
from guerilla warfare or insurgency, wherein combatants seek to overpower 
a hostile government through military force; from traditional warfare (which 
may also be understood as a form of political violence); and from efforts to 
target individuals.99 Instead, scholars seem to agree that the point of terrorism 
is to use violence to send a threatening message to the broader public or 
government.100 
This definition is accepted in Representative Schiff’s proposed 
legislation but broadened in the other two proposals. The drafted legislation 
by Senator McSally and Representatives Weber, McCaul, and Cuellar 
appears to lean towards § 2332b, by including intent to “influence, affect, or 
retaliate against the policy or conduct of a government.”101 This approach 
opens the door to the federal criminalization of any conduct motivated by 
any level of anger or resentment (or desire for political expression) that also 
damages property. Would a college student who throws a brick through the 
window of a federal ICE detention center in anger over recent immigration 
policies be considered a terrorist under the reasoning that they have 
“damaged a structure” with the intent to “influence . . . or retaliate against 
 
 97 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-33.5-1602 (West 2019) (defining an “Act of Terrorism” as 
having “the same meaning set forth in 18 U.S.C. sec. 3077(1) and 28 CFR 0.85(l),” each of which refers 
back to the definition in 18 U.S.C. § 2331). Other states have created definitions mirroring § 2331, as in 
Alabama’s antiterrorism statute, ALA. CODE § 13A-10-151 (2019): 
An act or acts constituting a specified offense as defined in subdivision (4) for which a person 
may be convicted in the criminal courts of this state, or an act or acts constituting an offense in 
any other jurisdiction within or outside the territorial boundaries of the United States which 
contains all of the essential elements of a specified offense, that is intended to do the following: 
a. Intimidate or coerce a civilian population. 
b. Influence the policy of a unit of government by intimidation or coercion. 
c. Affect the conduct of a unit of government by murder, assassination, or kidnapping. 
 98 § 2331; § 2332b(g)(5)(A). 
 99 Connor Huff & Joshua D. Kertzer, How the Public Defines Terrorism, 62 AM. J. POL. SCI. 55,  
69 (2018). 
 100 See supra note 94 and accompanying text; Huff & Kertzker, supra note 99, at 57 (“Most of our 
academic models of terrorism emphasize ‘victim-target differentiation,’ or the notion that terrorism is a 
communicative act . . . directed at broader audiences.”). 
 101 McSally Bill, supra note 13, § 2339E(a); Weber Bill, supra note 14, § 2339E(a). 
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the policy or conduct of a government”?102 Even murder that is committed 
out of anger and political retaliation is a far cry from what has been accepted 
as terrorism by most scholars, states, or nations, let alone adding vandalism 
to the mix. 
Adopting 18 U.S.C. § 2331’s definition (and more limited intent 
requirement) would not eliminate the risks posed by these proposed statutes. 
Even if domestic terror legislation adopted the more limited intent 
requirement, how would that intent be proven? As a country, we have 
accepted that al Qaeda and other organizations that have followed its 
ideological lead are terrorist organizations, in part because many of the most 
prominent leaders and recruiters seem to have eagerly accepted the label, 103 
and in part because FTO designation allows us to sidestep arguments about 
the label (because these are foreign relations, the Secretary of State is 
allowed to make this determination).104 But we have not had the opportunity 
to make this argument about white supremacist organizations. Those who 
have tried to make the argument that, for instance, Dylann Roof is “clearly” 
a terrorist, rely on simplifications of the definition of terrorism to mean any 
type of politically or ideologically motivated violence,105 or a baseline 
understanding that killing a certain number of people should always qualify 
as terrorism.106 Roof’s manifesto stated he wanted to spark a war—but he did 
not claim a desire to be involved with terrorism, to inspire terrorism, to 
intimidate the African American population or the civilian population in 
 
 102 Supra note 101. 
 103 See, e.g., Interview: Osama bin Laden, FRONTLINE (May 1998), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ 
pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/interview.html#video [https://perma.cc/D637-MTS7] (quoting 
Osama bin Laden as saying “[t]he terrorism we practice is of the commendable kind . . . . Terrorizing 
[aggressors] and punishing them are necessary measures to straighten things and to make them right”); 
Imam’s E-mails to Fort Hood Suspect Tame Compared with Online Rhetoric, DALL. MORNING NEWS 
(Nov. 28, 2009, 11:58 AM), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/texas/2009/11/28/imam-s-e-mails-to-
fort-hood-suspect-tame-compared-with-online-rhetoric [https://perma.cc/Q23D-5TCH] (quoting Anwar 
al Awlaki, recruiter for al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, as saying in a recorded speech: “‘Some 
Muslims say the way forward for this ummah [the Muslim people] is to distance itself from terrorism and 
spend their time in becoming good in business, good in technology, agriculture and the rest; and this is 
how we can compete with the rest of the world.’ But the Prophet Muhammad ‘said that this is wrong.’”). 
 104 The Secretary of State is empowered to designate Foreign Terrorist Organizations under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1189 (2012). 
 105 See, e.g., Norris, supra note 11, at 505. 
 106 See, e.g., Moustafa Bayoumi, Opinion, What’s a ‘Lone Wolf’? It’s the Special Name We Give 
White Terrorists, GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2017, 7:19 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
commentisfree/2017/oct/04/lone-wolf-white-terrorist-las-vegas [https://perma.cc/W5XY-4Q7Y]; Press 
Release, N.Y. State Senate, State Legislators: School Shootings Are Acts of Domestic Terrorism (Mar. 
1, 2018), https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/terrence-murphy/state-legislators-school-
shootings-are-acts-domestic [https://perma.cc/J7W4-V2GM] (“All perceived violence that threaten the 
lives of others, whether at a concert, place of worship or school, are terrorist threats, and must be handled 
in the same manner.”). 
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general, or even to retaliate against government policies.107 What would a 
jury want to see to answer such a question? Due to the language of our 
current statutes, which have avoided requiring terroristic intent, prosecutors 
to date have never had to prove whether or not terrorism defendants intended 
to intimidate or coerce a population or government. 
Perhaps worse yet, it might never need to be proven. An enraged public 
might easily jump to an assumption of this intent, despite the fact that the 
label carries huge implications in terms of public response as well as severity 
of punishment. Worryingly, proponents of a domestic terrorism statute seem 
to like the idea that the jury might look at the intent question simplistically, 
arguing for a less specific definition of terrorism, or in some cases a lower 
standard of proof.108 Of course, such a problematic inquiry lends itself to 
biased results. This is particularly true if there is no shared understanding of 
what is required to prove terroristic intent. Our society should be wary of 
conditioning a defendant’s conviction upon whether his particular radicalism 
is considered heroic or distasteful in his particular community (and jury 
pool). A more limited intent requirement, such as adopting § 2331, might 
limit these risks somewhat, but it will not erase them. 
2. Limiting the Proposals Through Minimum Harm Requirements 
The risks might be limited further by increasing the damage required 
(or the intended or threatened damage required) as elements of the crime. 
The three proposed statutes discussed above open the door to terrorism 
prosecutions for vandalism. A more limited application might be achieved 
by writing, for instance, a statute that specifically criminalizes mass murder. 
Professor Shirin Sinnar has argued that Supreme Court precedent would 
allow the scale of damage entailed in mass killings to justify federal authority 
in these areas, even without additional jurisdictional requirements.109 Sinnar 
notes, first, that many domestic extremists cross state lines in order to 
commit their violent acts, thus offering federal jurisdiction via the interstate 
commerce clause,110 and that the Court has already noted that “[t]he Federal 
Government undoubtedly has a substantial interest in enforcing criminal 
 
 107 Kevin Sack & Alan Blinder, No Regrets from Dylann Roof in Jailhouse Manifesto, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/05/us/no-regrets-from-dylann-roof-in-jailhouse-
manifesto.html [https://perma.cc/M3NL-GNK8]. 
 108 Norris, supra note 11, at 505–07. Specifically, Professor Norris argues that terrorism should be 
defined as any politically motivated violence and suggests that, even without a domestic terror statute, 
prosecutors should be encouraged to seek a Terrorism Sentencing Enhancement, which he notes 
approvingly could probably be obtained without proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was 
engaging in terrorism. Id. at 521–22. 
 109 Sinnar, supra note 12, at 1381. 
 110 Id. at 1380. 
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laws against assassination, terrorism, and acts with the potential to cause 
mass suffering.”111 
Such a statute could be written to be a terrorism statute by requiring 
terroristic intent. Alternatively, an independent mass murder statute could be 
added to existing federal criminal law, thereby partially satisfying critics’ 
contention that all mass shootings should be treated as terrorism,112 as well 
as offering an opportunity to respond to a national epidemic of mass 
shootings both related and unrelated to political motivations. If Congress 
wrote a mass murder statute, Congress could also amend the list of federal 
crimes of terrorism to include that statute, so that it might be used as a 
predicate offence for the Terrorism Sentencing Enhancement or application 
of § 2339A if a terroristic motive is present. 
However, requiring an intent of mass casualties rather than a single 
murder or property damage would limit, but by no means eradicate, the 
concerns associated with a new terrorism statute. It would add to our 
exceptionally punitive criminal justice system, and federalize every school 
shooting, many of which are perpetrated by juveniles or eighteen-year-olds, 
in addition to mass shootings by disgruntled employees or arising from 
domestic disputes. This is by no means an action to be taken lightly and, 
given the fact that other statutes already exist113 by which to pursue and 
incarcerate domestic neo-Nazis, it might not be worthwhile. 
B. Eradicate the List of Federal Crimes of Terrorism from Section 2339A 
Another alternative to a new domestic terrorism statute would be to 
simply eradicate the list of predicate offenses from § 2339A, the section of 
the U.S. Code that criminalizes providing material support for terrorism. 
(rather than for a designated FTO).114 Currently, § 2339A applies only when 
a person materially supports a specific terrorist act—any of the crimes listed 
under § 2332b(g)(5) as federal crimes of terrorism.115 Omitting the specified 
list of statutes and adopting instead, as so many state statutes have done, 
something to the effect of “any act of violence calculated to coerce a civilian 
population or government,” would allow the statute to reach more modern 
terrorist strategies.116 However, like the statutes described above, this would 
 
 111 Id. at 1381 (quoting Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 864 (2014)). 
 112 Id. at 1357. 
 113 Such as the hate crimes statute under which they are already prosecuted, 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2012). 
See infra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 114 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012). 
 115 Id. § 2332b(g)(5). 
 116 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-300(a) (West 2019) (“A person is guilty of an act of 
terrorism when such person, with intent to intimidate or coerce the civilian population or a unit of 
government, commits a felony involving the unlawful use or threatened use of physical force or 
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wildly increase federal authority to arrest and punish by expanding the range 
of crimes that could be considered terrorism and thus exposing the alleged 
offenders to more intrusive investigations. It would also carry the same 
questions regarding proving intent at a jury level, and the same wide 
opportunities for jurors’ biases to control the process.117 That said, these 
problems can be mitigated somewhat by limiting § 2339A to mass casualty 
efforts, as opposed to any crime, because it would narrow back down the 
range of available crimes. 
C. Designation 
A third option to deal with the current gap in the federal statutory 
framework regarding domestic terrorist attacks is to designate groups with 
ties to domestic terrorism as terrorist organizations. Creating a list of 
domestic terrorist organizations has clear First Amendment problems, but if 
the true difference between domestic and international terrorism 
investigations is the ability to use material support statutes, designating white 
supremacist terrorist organizations would be the most direct way to even the 
field.  
Of course, there are reasons that no domestic terrorist organization list 
exists. While First Amendment conflicts jump to mind most quickly as a 
 
violence.”); FLA. STAT. ANN § 775.30(1) (West 2019) (defining “terrorism” or “terrorist activity” as an 
activity that “(a) Involves: 1. A violent act or an act dangerous to human life which is a violation of the 
criminal laws of this state or of the United States; or 2. A violation of s. 815.06; and (b) Is intended to: 
1.Intimidate, injure, or coerce a civilian population; 2. Influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation or coercion; or 3. Affect the conduct of government through destruction of property, 
assassination, murder, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy”). 
 Language such as this allows prosecutors to pursue terrorism charges against lower level attacks, as 
well as allowing flexibility. Rather than enumerating specific types of violent actions that might be 
considered terrorism, statutes such as these allow any type of violence to be classified as terrorism if 
sufficient intent is shown—whether it is using a car in a crime of violence, using a firearm, using a knife, 
or using a frying pan. For instance, in New York, James Jackson recently pleaded guilty under New 
York’s terrorism statute, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.25(1) (McKinney 2019), which states that “[a] person 
is guilty of a crime of terrorism when, with intent to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence 
the policy of a unit of government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a unit of 
government by murder, assassination or kidnapping, he or she commits a specified offense.” Under N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 490.05 (McKinney 2019), a specified offense includes any violent offense. Jackson had 
stabbed a Black man to death on the streets of New York as part of an effort to begin a race war, in hopes 
that “the U.S. government would pursue a ‘global policy aimed at the complete extermination of the 
Negro race.’” Jonathan Allen, White Man Who Wanted Race War Pleads Guilty to New York Stabbing, 
REUTERS (Jan. 23, 2019, 12:27 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-new-york-murder/white-man-
who-wanted-race-war-pleads-guilty-to-new-york-stabbing-idUSKCN1PH2CO [https://perma.cc/399A-
2PJL]. It is worth noting, however, that Jackson pleaded guilty. Id. Here, too, prosecutors had no need to 
prove the intent to a jury. 
 117 See supra Section II.A. 
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problem with designation of domestic organizations, more direct political 
hurdles exist as well. 
1. First Amendment Concerns  
As Professor David Cole argues: 
A liberal democracy requires that its citizens be free to speak their minds, 
criticize the government, and join forces with like-minded others in those 
pursuits. The ability to associate and speak with domestic organizations is 
therefore at the very core of the First Amendment’s democratic purpose. . . . It 
is virtually impossible to imagine meaningful self-government if the state can 
prohibit speech in coordination with domestic political groups it 
disfavors. . . .118 
The ability of a government to designate domestic political 
organizations as terrorists has potentially chilling implications, especially if 
any and all association with the organization could be considered material 
support, with no necessity that defendants intend to support illegal or violent 
efforts to obtain political change (as is the express purpose of § 2339B119). 
Freedom of association, even with political groups that oppose the current 
government (and perhaps particularly with groups that oppose the current 
government) is “a basic mechanism of the democratic process,” and “has 
assumed even greater importance . . . [as] the individual, in order to realize 
his own capacities or to stand up to the institutionalized forces that surround 
him, has found it imperative to join with others of like mind in pursuit of 
common objectives.”120 This is because, in a democracy, the people must 
have every opportunity both to learn which social objectives they prefer and 
to advocate on behalf of those objectives to convince others and exert their 
political will.121 Moreover, “[r]estriction of associational expression is likely 
to become, in practice, an effort to suppress a whole social or political 
movement.”122 
 
 118 David Cole, The First Amendment’s Borders: The Place of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project 
in First Amendment Doctrine, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 147, 173 (2012) (citations omitted). 
 119 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 120 Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 1 
(1964). 
 121 Id. at 2–3; see also Thomas Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
655, 687–89 (2009) (suggesting that the right to advocate for lawbreaking might be a necessary aspect of 
self-government). 
 122 Emerson, supra note 120, at 23; see also Alan K. Chen, Free Speech and the Confluence of 
National Security and Internet Exceptionalism, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 379, 385 (2017) (“[T]he early 
twentieth-century Supreme Court recognized that advocacy of unlawfulness has social value, even if its 
decisions did not always reflect that. Without some type of meaningful constitutional scrutiny, 
government regulation of such expression could realistically suppress or chill what we might recognize 
as pure expressions of ideology.”). 
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In 1961 the Supreme Court recognized this necessity, holding that mere 
membership in an organization that pursued unlawful aims, including the use 
of violence to obtain its goals, could not be criminal.123 Only if the individuals 
themselves specifically intended to further those unlawful goals, or to obtain 
the organization’s goals through violence, could their membership be 
criminalized.124 In 1969, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Supreme Court 
expressly held that criminalizing advocacy of violence “as a means of 
accomplishing industrial or political reform” or criminalizing “assembly 
with others merely to advocate the described type of action” violated First 
Amendment protections.125 Instead, “[s]tatutes affecting the right of 
assembly” need to be limited to prohibiting “incitement to imminent lawless 
action.”126 Specifically, the Court stated that the First Amendment “do[es] 
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of 
law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”127 
While Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project allowed § 2339B to 
interfere with political speech in the international context, the Court 
expressly limited its holding to association with foreign organizations.128 If 
this holding applied to domestic organizations, criminalizing not just 
incitement to imminent lawless action, and not just advocacy for lawless 
action, but any type of support for any listed organization that the U.S. has 
deemed to be a terrorist organization, it would fundamentally alter our 
understanding of the right to speak about government. 
Moreover, as in the context of proving terrorist intent, most domestic 
organizations do not claim to be “terrorists” or “committed to violent 
overthrow” the way that many designated foreign organizations have.129 Can 
 
 123 Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 205–06 (1961). 
 124 Id. at 229. 
 125 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969) (internal quotations omitted). 
 126 Id. at 449 n.4 (emphasis added). 
 127 Id. at 447. 
 128 561 U.S. 1, 39 (2010). 
 129 Leaders of RAM state that the group is not racist, and that it has a positive influence on its 
members. Rise Above Movement, S. POVERTY LAW CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-
hate/extremist-files/group/rise-above-movement [https://perma.cc/3ZND-GG5D]. Similarly, the Ku 
Klux Klan “identifies itself today as a Christian ‘civil rights for whites’ organization.” Megan Ross et al., 
White Extremist Groups Are Growing—And Changing, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Sept. 5, 2018,  
9:42 AM), https://publicintegrity.org/federal-politics/white-extremist-groups-are-growing-and-changing 
[https://perma.cc/2AN6-PCW3]. In general, many extremist groups appear to have attempted to soften 
their public image. Id. (describing both the express disavowal of terrorism by some groups, and the 
strategic efforts of other groups to appear to be acting defensively, when in fact they are aggressively 
planning violence); see also Jerome P. Bjelopera, Domestic Terrorism: An Overview, CONGRESSIONAL 
RES. SERV. 2 (Aug. 21, 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44921.pdf [https://perma.cc/SK7B-TPED] 
(“Aware of the lines between constitutionally protected speech and criminality, domestic terrorists often 
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we allow the federal government to determine that an organization is 
advocating violent overthrow when that organization claims to be “preparing 
for civil war” or “training members for self-defense”?130 If we allow the 
government to determine when an organization is sufficiently dangerous, 
especially when that organization has not itself claimed to be intent on the 
 
rope themselves off from ideological (above-ground) elements that openly and often legally espouse 
similar beliefs. In essence, the practitioners who commit violent acts are distinct from the propagandists 
who theorize and craft worldviews that could be interpreted to support these acts. Thus, in decentralized 
fashion, terrorist lone actors (lone wolves) or isolated small groups (cells) generally operate 
autonomously and in secret, all the while drawing ideological sustenance—not direction—from 
propagandists operating in the free market of ideas.”). 
 130 RAM, for instance “portrays itself as a defense force for a Western civilization under assault by 
Jews, Muslims and brown-skinned immigrants from south of the Rio Grande.” A.C. Thompson, Racist, 
Violent, Unpunished: A White Hate Group’s Campaign of Menace, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 19, 2017, 2:01 
PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/white-hate-group-campaign-of-menace-rise-above-movement 
[https://perma.cc/HCX5-HYS4]. RAM leaders specifically discourage using violent language online or 
adopting an aggressive (rather than defensive) posture regarding violence—which law enforcement 
claims is a strategy to avoid arrest. Complaint, supra note 1, at 5–6. RAM describes its violent intent at 
protests as providing “security.” Id. at 9. They continue to refer to “defend[ing] America” and “Da Goyim 
Know.” Id. at 10. This refers to a worldview that they are pushing back against a global Jewish 
conspiracy—again, a violent but defensive posture. The Proud Boys, whose members have also been 
arrested for violence at protests, specifically tells members to respond to violence (and to bait opposing 
protestors into initiating violence), and also specifically advises members “to only speak in terms of self-
defense.” Andy Campbell, Leaked Proud Boys Chats Show Members Plotting Violence at Rallies, 
HUFFPOST (May 22, 2019, 2:44 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/proud-boys-chat-logs-
premeditate-rally-violence-in-leaked-chats_n_5ce1e231e4b00e035b928683 [https://perma.cc/CZ35-
BMHL]. Officially, the Proud Boys maintain that they are “a politically incorrect men’s club for ‘Western 
chauvinists’ and deny affiliations with far-right extremist groups that overtly espouse racist and anti-
Semitic views.” Michael Kunzelman, Chief: Officer’s Proud Boys Membership Didn’t Break Policy, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 15, 2019), https://apnews.com/12ece8cedbf045259dcddebf619141e7 
[https://perma.cc/VB6N-9UAN]. 
 If these two groups seem obviously disingenuous in their “defensive” posture, the hundreds of right-
wing militias that are currently “training for civil war” and similarly provide “security” in preparation for 
left-wing violence at protests present a far more difficult question. Eleonore Sens, ‘I’m Prepared for Civil 
War’: In America’s South, Militias are Preparing for Battle, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 17, 2017, 8:40 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/afp-in-americas-south-militias-prepare-for-battle-2017-8 
[https://perma.cc/9V3Q-SKDT]. Another right-wing militia group, the Three Percenters, say they are a 
strictly defensive force. Why Armed Militia Groups Are Surging Across the Nation, PBS NEWS HOUR 
(Apr. 19, 2017, 7:48 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/armed-militia-groups-surging-across-
nation [https://perma.cc/Z8N2-6YKY]. The group dropped a group member after discovering he had been 
involved in a bomb plot. Devlin Barrett, Man Charged in Anti-government Bomb Plot in Oklahoma City, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/oklahoma-man-
charged-in-anti-government-bomb-plot/2017/08/14/97816686-80f9-11e7-ab27-1a21a8e006ab_
story.html [https://perma.cc/83YN-N8NL]. Many of these groups, and less formally organized online 
extremist groups, have been associated with right-wing extremist violence. See, e.g., SETH G. JONES, CTR. 
FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, THE RISE OF FAR-RIGHT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES (Nov. 
2018), https://www.csis.org/analysis/rise-far-right-extremism-united-states [https://perma.cc/7B8R-
4E74]; Terrorist Bomb Incidents in Minnesota and Illinois Linked to Militia Group, ANTI-DEFAMATION 
LEAGUE (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.adl.org/blog/terrorist-bomb-incidents-in-minnesota-and-illinois-
linked-to-militia-group [https://perma.cc/PU5J-2FSW]. 
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use of terrorism or violence to achieve its political goals, that power to 
designate organizations may be abused quickly and easily.131 
2. Limiting First Amendment Conflicts by Designating Only Foreign 
Organizations 
The threat to domestic political activity might be limited somewhat by 
continuing to designate only foreign organizations but broadening the 
political types of foreign organizations that are designated. It has become 
increasingly clear that the white supremacist terror threat is a global one.132 
This suggests that foreign white supremacist organizations could be 
designated as FTOs and connections to those organizations, or mere 
inspiration from and support for those organizations, could be pursued in the 
same way that connections to al Qaeda are pursued—through prosecution 
under § 2339B (which prohibits material support of an organization if the 
organization has been designated as an FTO).133 As one way to avoid the 
delicate political questions surrounding which groups are designated as 
terrorist organizations, the U.S. could begin by designating groups listed by 
Canada,134 and other countries with whom we have strong ties. Respecting 
other countries’ determinations about the purpose and extremity of such 
groups might be easier than trusting our own government to make 
determinations about the level of radicalism of groups that are critical of it. 
This still would have heavy implications for free speech within the United 
States, as has § 2339B already,135 but the implications are arguably less 
extreme when only international (or transnational) organizations are 
prohibited. 
 
 131 See supra notes 118–122 and accompanying text. 
 132 See White Supremacy Hearing, supra note 5 (Representative Ocasio-Cortez: “Is white supremacy 
not a global issue?” Assistant Director McGarrity: “It is a global issue.”); Weiyi Cai & Simone Landon, 
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 133 See Ali H. Soufan, Opinion, I Spent 25 Years Fighting Jihadis. White Supremacists Aren’t So 
Different., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/05/opinion/white-supremacy-
terrorism.html [https://perma.cc/9ZXK-HCBL]; see also SOUFAN CTR., WHITE SUPREMACY 
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3. Political Will as a Practical Hurdle to Expanded Designation 
Even if we determined that designating radical (transnational) political 
groups as FTOs was useful enough to justify the possible imposition on 
political speech, it is questionable whether there exists the political will to 
do so. Unlike statutory changes, the decision to designate an organization as 
a foreign terrorist group is purely within the discretion of the executive 
branch.136 This means that the ability to designate foreign organizations as 
FTOs already exists. Were the political will present in the executive branch, 
presumably the organizations would be designated already. Some critics 
have charged that the executive branch has built up strong support in the 
right supremacist fringe, and therefore is slow to act to sanction such 
groups.137 Others charge that white supremacists could already be treated as 
terrorists by law enforcement agencies, but that these agencies appear to have 
made a political choice not to focus on white supremacist organizations, and 
to concern themselves with “ecoterrorists” and “black identity extremists” 
instead.138 
The legislative branch, too, has been slow to determine that groups are 
extremist.139 The Ukrainian Azov Battalion that trained the RAM assailants, 
as described at the beginning of this Essay,140 has been the subject of 
legislative debate for years. For three years, “House-passed spending 
bills . . . included a ban on U.S. aid to Ukraine from going to the Azov 
Battalion, but the provision was stripped out before final passage each 
year.”141 Only in 2018 did the ban make it through.142 Until that point, the 
U.S. government was, to some extent, funding, arming, and even training the 
group as part of its support for Ukrainian security against Russian 
incursion.143 
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In sum, though designation might be a more effective and successful 
move in terms of equaling out both prosecution and investigation of terrorist 
organizations, it might also prove a larger hurdle to jump, given that it is a 
largely discretionary determination and those with the power to make the 
designation appear to have no interest in doing so. In an effort to surmount 
this hurdle, congressional action via the creation or amendment of statutes 
can give ammunition to federal agents who want to pursue domestic 
terrorists, without necessarily involving more politically hesitant executive 
actors. But the concerns of expanding the reach of § 2339B and its effect on 
political speech remain.144 Designating domestic groups as FTOs is likely the 
only way to truly even out treatment of terrorists among those with right- or 
left-wing ideologies and those whose ideologies are in some way related to 
al Qaeda. But there is good reason to question whether we would want to 
expand the infringement on speech that already exists in the international 
sphere to organizations that are both domestic in origin and concerned with 
domestic activity, even if doing so would be “fair.” 
D. Additions to the List of Federal Crimes of Terrorism 
Yet another alternative to the problem at the heart of this Essay is to add 
more crimes the list of federal crimes of terrorism. The list of federal crimes 
of terrorism is outdated, both in terms of dealing with new, decentralized 
international terrorism and in regard to the threat of domestic terrorism.145 
Several statutes would seem to lend themselves as solutions. 
 HATE CRIMES—18 U.S.C. § 249 criminalizes “willfully caus[ing] 
bodily injury to any person or, through the use of fire, a firearm, a dangerous 
weapon, or an explosive or incendiary device, attempt[ing] to cause bodily 
injury to any person, because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, 
or national origin of any person.”146 The statute has often been used, rather 
than terrorism charges, in cases where onlookers believed the defendant 
should be charged “as a terrorist” (such as Roof’s).147 
The relationship between hate crimes and terrorism is complicated. It is 
probable that not all hate crimes should be considered terrorism and some 
 
 144 See supra notes 118–130 and accompanying text. 
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scholars think none should. Many scholars, for instance, think the terrorism 
label should be applied only when violence is indiscriminate, while others 
think terrorism is only a weapon of the weak, and hate crimes only a weapon 
of the socially powerful.148 Others refer to hate crimes as “the original 
domestic terrorism,” and argue that all hate crimes should be considered 
terrorism,149 or, at least, extremely closely related.150  
But adding this statute to § 2332b(g)(5)’s list of federal crimes of 
terrorism would not make all hate crimes terrorism. The listed crimes 
become terrorism only if they are “calculated to influence or affect the 
conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against 
government conduct.”151 This would allow some nuance and distinction in 
the use of the term “terrorism,” and in the application of § 2339A. It could 
enable the federal government to recognize that, at least sometimes, hate 
crimes are also terrorism—calculated not only to harm an individual who is 
hated based on his or her status, but also to intimidate and coerce others in 
that subgroup of the civilian population, and sometimes the civilian 
population as a whole. 
Were hate crimes a possible federal crime of terrorism, defendants such 
as Dylann Roof, and James Alex Fields Jr.152 could be prosecuted as 
terrorists. As the law currently stands, no terrorism statute prohibits their 
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conduct—there is no federal crime of mass murder using a gun or a car.153 
Certainly, no such statute is included in the list of federal crimes of terrorism, 
nor is the hate crimes statute under which both men were prosecuted.154 
While the question might remain as to whether their intentions were broad 
enough to qualify as terrorists (to intimidate or coerce government, or a 
civilian population, or to retaliate against the government), that question 
could be put directly to the jury. 
RIOTS—18 U.S.C. § 2101 prohibits interstate travel or the use of 
interstate commerce in order to commit, incite, promote, or aid in rioting.155 
The white supremacist RAM complaint suggests that violent activity as part 
of a protest is a calculated and organized effort by right-wing groups, which 
may be used to intimidate the civilian population and deter engagement in 
First Amendment activities.156 Shared memes and white supremacist 
conversations recommending running down protestors also seem to carry an 
implication that such groups are interested in using violence to intimidate 
protestors not to come out and protest.157 This would appear to fit the 
definition of terrorism: If a jury agreed that intimidation was the purpose of 
the violence, RAM’s rioting would be use of violence in an effort to 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population. 
The riot statute might be particularly useful as it at least appears to 
address a favored strategy of RAM. However, it also might present 
particularly serious dangers. Groups that protest are likely to be among the 
most disfavored oppositional political groups, and the ongoing 
disagreements regarding who initiated violence at political rallies158 seems to 
suggest this is an area that is easily distorted by bias. 
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RICO & VICAR—The possibility of using RICO (Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act), the organized crime law 
enforcement powerhouse,159 to pursue terrorists, has been floated in legal 
scholarship since at least 1990.160 Its use, however, has been rare.161 Both 
RICO and VICAR (Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering)162 have been 
successfully used to prosecute gangs on the basis that the gang is an 
enterprise, defined as a “group of individuals associated in fact.”163 To 
qualify, the core organization must have “some structure for the making of 
decisions and a core of persons who function as a continuing unit,” but if the 
broader organization has this structure, and affects interstate commerce, 
satellite (local) subsets of the organization can be prosecuted under the same 
theory.164 While RICO requires multiple criminal offenses, VICAR requires 
only one violent crime committed “for the purpose of gaining entrance to or 
maintaining or increasing position” in the enterprise.165 Presumably, crimes 
committed in order to gain entrance to or gain prestige in a terroristic gang 
such as RAM, therefore, could be prosecuted under this statute, although 
crimes committed in order to vaguely support RAM’s ideology could not. 
Adding these statutes to the list of federal crimes of terrorism would give 
some additional ability to label and punish these crimes as “terrorism,” but 
not as broad a reach as would designating domestic organizations as FTOs. 
DESTRUCTION OF MOTOR VEHICLES—Given the recent spate of van 
attacks and the urging of terrorist organizations to commit such attacks,166 it 
is tempting to suggest that 18 U.S.C. § 33 (“Destruction of motor vehicles or 
motor vehicle facilities”) be included as a possible federal crime of terrorism. 
Surely using a Home Depot truck to kill eight tourists and damaging the truck 
in the process qualifies as damaging a motor vehicle “with a reckless 
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disregard for the safety of human life.”167 The sister statute respecting 
destruction of aircraft is already listed in § 2332b(g)(5).168 
FIREARMS—Similarly, given modern terrorism’s turn to firearms and 
away from explosives,169 it is confusing that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2018) 
(criminalizing possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence) 
is not included in the list of possible terrorism predicates. 
As in the case of hate crimes, adding statutes such as these to 
§ 2332b(g)(5) would not mandate that they be prosecuted as terrorism—it 
would provide an option and an opportunity to make the argument that a 
defendant’s intent was terrorism. This nuance, of course, would also open up 
the same concerns as described in regard to creating a terrorism statute. It is 
unclear how a jury would make this determination or whether a jury should 
be trusted to do so. Moreover, hiding the terror intent requirement in a list of 
predicates, rather than as a primary offense, might hide the question from the 
jury, enabling the government to avoid having to prove the element. For each 
of these statutes there is a question as to how much the government would 
have to prove in order to get a conviction under § 2339A, and if the answer 
is that the hurdle would not be so high, the question remains whether we 
really want to give the government that much reach. 
E. Existing Solutions to the Sentencing Enhancement Issue 
One of the major discrepancies between the treatment of domestic and 
international terrorists is that of sentencing. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
offer an enhancement for people who commit federal crimes of terror, 
resulting in an extreme change in sentences.170 The disparity in punishment 
between domestic terrorists, often convicted of non-terror crimes, and 
international terrorists, is therefore similarly extreme. On the question of the 
sentencing enhancement in particular, Professor Jesse Norris has suggested 
that it might be available even to defendants who had not committed a 
predicate offense.171 The language of the enhancement indicates that it is 
available when a crime is committed in order to promote a federal crime of 
terrorism.172 Norris suggests that even if a particular crime of terrorism were 
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not intended, certain actions such as trying to start a race war would almost 
certainly result in classic terrorist activities once such a war had begun.173 
Norris argues that by attempting to start a race war, which presumably would 
include classic terrorist attacks, domestic extremists should be seen as 
promoting federal crimes of terrorism.174 Moreover, at the sentencing level, 
this requirement need only be proven at a preponderance of the evidence 
standard.175 The sentencing judge is also given an option for upward 
departure if it is proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant had the requisite intent (to intimidate), but not to promote any 
specific crime.176 This strategy might broaden the reach of the sentencing 
enhancement significantly, bringing something closer to parity of 
punishment between traditional foreign and modern domestic terrorism. 
But the repercussions of relying on such a weak standard of proof, and 
the biases of individual judges, are concerning. 
F. Simply Use Different Language 
A more straightforward option is simply to call domestic attacks 
terrorism. While this would not even out sentences or investigative authority, 
Assistant Director McGarrity has suggested that the FBI commonly runs 
terrorism investigations parallel to hate crime investigations, and that at least 
those incidents highlighted in the June hearing had been considered domestic 
terrorism within the FBI.177 The Justice Department appears to believe, as do 
so many critics, that actions such as Roof’s mass murder and Fields’s vehicle 
attack fit the definition of terrorism under § 2331.178 They state that they 
investigate these incidents as terrorism investigations, and that the sole 
reason they are not prosecuted under terrorism statutes is that no current 
terrorism statute fits those crimes.179 Must there be an official terrorism 
charge in order to use the word in public?180 Did we hesitate to call Al Capone 
a mobster, simply because we could only charge him with tax evasion? 
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Merely using the word could lessen the social effects that concern many 
critics, such as reinforcing racial stereotypes and othering.181 However, the 
sticking point may, again, be more of a political issue. The label is applied 
by spokespeople, not prosecutors or FBI agents, and such positions lend 
themselves to a consideration of political pushback, such as the pushback 
that resulted in lessening focus on white supremacists in the first place.182 
Additionally, the FBI’s decision not to use the label without a charge is not 
so surprising, given the critical press it received in the early 2000s for 
labeling defendants “terrorists” and charging them with fraud and false 
statements.183 
CONCLUSION 
For several years now, the nation has wrestled with the fact that right-
wing extremist violence is treated noticeably differently from what has 
traditionally been referred to as foreign terrorism.184 Part of the debate around 
this issue has stemmed from the recognition that the label of “foreign” is 
superficial and misleading.185 Domestic defendants, who are U.S. citizens, 
who never traveled abroad, and who completed terrorist attacks without any 
direction from a designated FTO, are given the label of “terrorist” and their 
cases are resolved as international terrorism on the sole basis that they appear 
to have been sympathetic to the cause of an FTO.186 Worse, the harm done 
and the threat posed by domestic extremists seems to have matched or 
exceeded that done by international terrorists in recent years—certainly the 
scale of attacks and tactics used have been similar,187 and domestic extremists 
have perpetrated attacks more often.188 
The fact that the FTOs most commonly and publicly pursued by law 
enforcement are associated with radical Islam and the Middle East has 
encouraged racially and religiously disparate treatment, as well as reinforced 
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racial and religious biases in the general public.189 It also points to inadequate 
protection by law enforcement, as right-wing extremist violence appears to 
be prevalent, yet not a priority for federal agencies.190 
Commentary on this issue often suggests that the problem is that no 
domestic terrorism statute exists.191 This leads to the natural conclusion that 
a domestic terrorism statute is needed,192 and indeed, several have been 
suggested in Congress.193 But, as this Essay has shown, al Qaeda and ISIS 
prosecutions are also rarely pursued through statutes prohibiting terrorist 
acts.194 No generalized statute exists to criminalize terrorist acts,195 and 
creating a terrorist acts statute (as the congressional drafts currently suggest) 
would federalize vast swaths of criminal behavior that has traditionally been 
left to the states, as well as behavior that probably would not be considered 
terrorism by the general public (and arguably should not be).196 It is also 
problematic because the definition of terrorism is highly contested, has not 
been challenged in courts, and appears to lend itself to bias and prejudice—
facts that would almost certainly lead to problems were the issue to come 
before a jury.197 
Moreover, a terrorist acts statute would not reach the type of nonviolent 
activity that is actively pursued in the international context, and therefore 
would not fully equalize prosecutions of domestic and international 
extremists.198 These cases, which make up the majority of terrorism 
prosecutions, rely on material support statutes.199 Fully equalizing the pursuit 
of right-wing terrorists would require designating foreign organizations that 
these domestic terrorists communicate with, or designating domestic 
organizations.200 But designating domestic organizations would be a 
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constitutional sea change with respect to the First Amendment.201 
Designating foreign organizations would be less invasive, but still quite 
invasive and possibly less effective.202 
But these two strategies, designation or a generalized statute 
criminalizing terrorist acts, are not the only options available to law 
enforcement. This Essay has suggested several alternative options, including 
adding to the list of crimes enumerated in the “federal crimes of terrorism,”203 
omitting the requirement that “terrorist acts” consist only of certain predicate 
crimes,204 writing a domestic terrorism statute that is limited to mass murder 
attempts,205 broadening the use of the Terrorism Sentencing Enhancement,206 
or simply referring to more cases as “terrorism cases,” whether or not 
terrorism charges can be brought.207 
It is impossible to offer authority to law enforcement without increasing 
the risk that it be abused, it is unlikely that law enforcement authority in 
international terrorism cases is going to be limited any time soon, and 
therefore, it is unlikely that we can create parity between domestic and 
international terrorism investigations without granting significant increased 
authority to law enforcement. Each of the suggested possible solutions bring 
with it the possibility of abuse that is already present in the international 
context, and the possibility that particularly harsh criminal laws will be 
applied selectively and in a biased manner. Limiting the reach of any new 
statutes can lessen the breadth of authority given to the Department of 
Justice, but will leave disparities between domestic and international 
terrorism. If not domestic organizations, designating foreign organizations 
like the Azov Battalion as terrorist groups would most likely come closest to 
closing the gap between the types of terrorism, but would also bring the 
awesome reach of § 2339B even further into use, risking broad infringement 
of First Amendment rights. It also may be a losing suggestion, given political 
considerations. 
But if nothing else, it should be clear that a broad terrorism statute is far 
from the only option to deal with this threat and disparity. This Essay has 
been an effort to show that other options are available. The arguments for a 
domestic terrorism statute are compelling, but so are the risks of misuse. 
Taking action to make domestic terrorism prosecutions more common 
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should be done carefully, with consideration as to how such risks can be 
minimized, the range of opportunities to change current practice, and the 
comparative dangers of each. 
